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CONFEDERATE FINANCE: A DOCUMENTARY STUDY
OF A PROPOSAL OF DAVID L. YULEE
by ARTHUR W. THOMPSON
The growth of total war in the twentieth century has increasingly focused our attention on the importance and role of
domestic economic relationships, particularly those concerned
with fiscal policy. The problem of financing a war effort is not
a new one however, and the outcome of many a struggle has
hinged upon its effective solution. In the case of the American
Civil War, a contemporary historian has written: “One of the
most fundamental causes of the ultimate failure of the Confederacy lay in its unwise financial policies.“ 1 That the failure
to devise an effective fiscal structure was a contributory factor
in the collapse of the Confederacy, will be doubted by few
historians.
There were many obstacles that loomed large in blocking the
creation of an orderly system of Confederate finance. The proposition “that the Confederacy was a firmly established government instead of merely one in the making was . . . fatal . . . .“ 2
Foreign trade and international loans were effectively curtailed
by the blockade, while Federal invasion disrupted the collection
of taxes and the marketing of bonds. Furthermore, in an agrarian,
debtor area, whose assets could not be liquidated with ease, the
raising of sufficient funds proved an almost impossible task.
The paths open to the new government, therefore, were
limited. Bond issues, paper money, and taxation were available
for interest payments, purchasing, and governmental operation.
The issuance of paper money had not been planned as a war
measure. 3 Yet the failure of the first bond issue by the Spring of
1861 made it evident “that the Treasury could not depend on
1. E. M. Coulter, The Confederate States of America (Baton Rouge,
1950), p. 149.
2. Idem.
3. Ibid., p. 158.
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the sale of bonds to provide cash for the needs of the government.“ 4
The first Confederate Secretary of the Treasury, Christopher
G. Memminger, had planned a diversified financial program
that included "bonds, a paper currency, and taxes,” yet Congress
rapidly “embarked on the easy road of paying its debts in unsecured paper and bonds.“ 5 To his repeated pleas for some tax
legislation, the “economy-minded” Congress turned a deaf ear.
It was easier to print money and bonds than to set up a tax
system. Besides, tax returns would be slow and would not be of
any consequence in what was expected to be a short war.
Nevertheless, early in 1861, with the pressure for taxation
growing, indirect and, more and more, direct levies were
gradually instituted. An 1861 tariff produced altogether about
6
$1,000,000 in specie. A small export tax on cotton, however,
served to embitter the planters. Direct levies, established early
in the war on real estate, livestock, slaves, and certain personal
possessions had produced only $18,000,000 by 1863. The permanent Constitution, adopted on March 11, 1861, contained provisions against further direct taxation unless “apportioned among
the several States.“ 7 Nevertheless, by 1863, the demand for a tax
program could not be stemmed any longer. Davis, Stephens,
Toombs and Memminger recommended it; large portions of the
press advocated it; and leading citizens of the community
supported it. As a result, on April 24, 1863, and in defiance of
the Constitution, the Confederate Congress enacted a comprehensive system of taxation. Its provisions included an 8 per cent
ad valorum tax on farm and forest products, occupational and
license taxes, a low, graduated income tax, and a retroactive tax
4. R. W. Patrick, Jefferson Davis and His Cabinet (Baton Rouge, 1944),
p. 211.
5. Coulter, op. cit., p. 153.
6. Ibid., p. 174.
7. Journal of the Congress of the Confederate States, I, 910 (Constitution of the Confederate States; Art. I, Sec. 2, par. 3).
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on excess profits. Congress also provided for a tax on agricultural
production - reminiscent of the tithe - to be paid in kind.
In February, 1864, still another unconstitutional tax law was
passed providing for an additional 5 per cent on real and personal property. A year later, Memminger’s successor, Secretary
Trenholm, was still pleading for more tax revenue to raise a
necessary three-quarters of a billion dollars. 8 But by that time
the end had come. In all, it has been estimated that approximately 1 per cent of Confederate income came from taxation. 9
In retrospect, it is clear that the Confederate Congress had
been unwilling to face the reality of a tax program adequate to
the needs of the situation. Whether or not the public would have
supported an extensive tax scheme cannot be said. Yet there
were those who did advocate such a program, among them
former United States Senator David L. Yulee, and his wife,
Nancy Wickliffe Yulee. Whether the high tax proponents,
including the Yulees, would have maintained their ardor in the
face of such a program is impossible to say. 10
In December, 1863, Mrs. Yulee wrote to her old friend in
Richmond, Mrs. Clement C. Clay, wife of a Confederate Alabama
senator : Homosassa [Florida]
Dec 9 1863

My dear Mrs Clay
You have not forgotten me I know, and will be glad to
know we are happy & well in spite of all the evil the
Yankees have done my people. I pity those who . . . dont
know the happiness of dwelling among their own people.
8. Patrick, op. cit., p. 241.
9. Coulter, op. cit., p. 182.
10. On a number of occasions during the War, Yulee’s patriotism was
called into question. His initial refusal to turn over to the Confederate
government 50,000 pounds of sugar produced on his Homosassa
plantation as well as his strong objections to the removal of iron from
the Florida Railroad of which company he was president, tends to
leave some doubt as to whether his “pay as we go” proposal would
have continued to enjoy his enthusiastic support.
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I pity those who have no country to love, to fight for, to
die if need be, for.
It is this very country of yours and mine, that induces me
to write this letter. I want you to use your influence, (you
have much) to induce those faulty [?] law makers to come
up to our necessities, and put our currency right. Your
husband is all right I know. Tax, tax, tax our people to half
we have if necessary but let the World know we ARE
paying. Ten victories will not give the Yankees such a blow
as this fact. Now Mrs Clay I don’t ask you to step out of
your way, but God has given you many friends, stir them up
to their duty and let us be the proudest people, because the
most honest.
Mr Yulee is surrounded by difficulties. Our plantation is
only four miles from the gulf. The Yankees could come up
in barges any moment, but we have some sharp shooters
on the bank and they know it. They think Mr Yulee has a
rifled cannon but that is a mistake. Well if he moves us in
the interior we have a more unhealthy climate and less to
eat, for our fine fish and oysters are worth a little risk, and
then our children have perfect health on the coast. Besides
on all our little rivers the Yankees have got whipped and
they are afraid. I have been here now two years hearing
their guns chasing blockaders or firing on Tampa or Bay
Port. But I am not afraid. A trouble is upon us however
which if it succeeds Mr Yulee says he must abandon his
home and seek in South Georgia perhaps a refuge. The Gov
has demanded the iron from one of our roads and I think
part of another. The people of East Florida will then be
left without any means of bringing corn or troops to our
assistance in case of an invasion and the enemy can take
possession as soon as he learns our roads have been taken
by our Gov. Mr Yulee has always said if the roads were
taken, it would lead to a military abandonment of Florida.
I do believe I would regret this move, more for my country’s
sake than my own; but the heart is so deceitful I will not
declare it. However I believe our people will appeal to the
law . . . . Do write me a long letter in your own delightful
style. How I would like to have a long talk with you. I am
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forty miles from a neighbor and a pleasant letter is my only
society. Bragg’s defeat fills us all with gloom, yet we are
not discouraged. I have never felt a doubt of my country.
But dark and painful trials are yet before us perhaps. Dear
Mrs Clay have you given your heart to Jesus! Do use those
talents he has-given you for His glory? Soon this Earth will
perish but we shall live forever. May it be with the blessed
Lord.
Yours very truly
Sincerely
-

-

-

-

N. C. Yulee

11

Less than three weeks after this letter was written, Thomas J.
Semmes of Louisiana reported to the Confederate Senate his
Finance Committee’s bill on ways and means “to provide for a
new issue of Treasury notes, and for funding all such notes now
outstanding.“ 12 Coming on top of Memminger’s December 7,
1863 report calling for “a comprehensive scheme of funding,“ 13
Semmes’proposal finally called forth a lengthy letter from Yulee
to Florida’s Senator James M. Baker. 14 In contrast to his wife’s
earlier letter touching upon the same subject, it is not as personalized or emotional in its appeal, nor is it as religiously
oriented. Rather, it reveals an aspect of the economic mind of
a mid-Nineteenth century Southern entrepreneur. 15
11. Original in Duke University Library. Photostatic copy in P. K. Yonge
Library of Florida History, University of Florida.
12. Journal of the Congress of the Confederate States, III, 492 (28 December 1863).
13. Patrick, op. cit., p. 214.
14. In contrast to Semmes’ position, David L. Yulee was more in agreement with Senators W. S. Oldham (Texas) and G. A. Henry (Tennessee) who favored higher tax proposals. Pamphlet in the P. K.
Yonge Library (Yulee Papers) University of Florida. Speech of Hon.
W. S. Oldham of Texas, on the Subject of the Finances, Senate,
December 23, 1863.
15. Retained copy in Yulee’s hand in Yulee Papers: Yulee to Baker,
Homosassa, Jan. 12, 1864.
This exceptional collection of papers for the study of Florida’s
history during the period of Yulee’s life was presented to the University of Florida by Senator Yulee’s daughter, Mrs. Florida Yulee
Neff, through Professor Rembert W. Patrick of the University, who
generously made the papers available to this writer, now at work on
a biography and documentary study of Senator Yulee.

Published by STARS, 1951

5

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 30 [1951], No. 2, Art. 4
198

FLORIDA HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

Dear Sir:

Homosassa, Jany 12. 1864

I promised that I would write you after seeing the plans
proposed by the Govt for settling the finances. Having seen
these, & the plan also of the Senate Committee, I now briefly
give you my opinion; not because I think it specially valuable,
but because in this critical conjuncture of our affairs, we should
all throw in our mite to the general stock of thought upon the
subject.
All the plans strike me as faulty in the policy of saddling
our young Confederacy with the duty of paying in coin the
nominal sum of our existing liabilities. A funded debt of fifteen
hundred million, with the increase which this policy once entered upon will compel, THE CONFEDERACY CANNOT
BEAR. It will be death to its credit now, when it needs credit,
and crippling in all its future career: besides that it may lead
to an oppressive and consolidated government.
What the Govt justly owes it must liquidate at every hazard,
I agree. But for the Treasury notes now out, or the bonds
which represent funded treasury notes, the Government has
not received value upon the metalic basis, and therefore ought
not in equity to be expected, at the cost of the country’s ruin,
to pay them in coin, or to establish as a permanent debt upon
the standard of the metals.
As I wrote you a year ago, a sufficient taxation is the necessary basis of all our financial policy. We must make the tax
adequate to the requirements of the day. To “pay as we go”
is a rule which no people can discard without commensurate
injury to their permanent prosperity: and this rule should be
observed in War as in Peace. The burthen may be very great
in time of war - but better to bear it in our own day, than to
saddle our posterity with the evils of debt. The Country can
bear, and bear profitably for so great a boon as Independence,
a tax equal to the whole net income of the capital and industry
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of the Confederacy. And this will be sufficient, in a healthful
state of values, to support the war, last as long as it reasonably
may. What, after all, will such a tax amount to, but a mere
contribution, for the short period of the war, of our annual
excess, to the common treasury for a purpose essential to the
preservation of the principal from which the income is derived,
and its future enjoyment. It is simply the sacrifise [sic] of
accumulation during the war, for the success of the cause; and
rests upon the idea that in this struggle for existence, we should
regard the Confederacy as one common field or encampment,
in which every person should contribute his efforts & resources;
either to fight, or to support the fighters: and until we settle
down upon this idea, in a practical way, we have not reached the
ultimate duty and necessity of the day. Draw then upon the
people for their whole net income, or as much of it as will
furnish their Government, under the Providence of God, with
“its daily bread.”
But you may reasonably object that to convert the production or income of the country into money for the payment of
taxes to the extent of the large annual contribution required
by the war, will be a difficult operation. The difficulty is avoided
by receiving the income of the country in kind, so far as it
may be of a kind suitable for the consumption of the army,
or the supply of the Government wants. Let the banks & capitalists pay in money, the farmers in breadstuffs, wool, cotton
or other product, the manufacturer in iron, cloth, or whatever
he produces, the stock raiser in beef & hides, the railroads in
transportation, and so on. Each man surrendering to his Government the required share of his excess: for upon excess of
income I would throw the whole burden. In order to reach a
just estimate of net income, settle how much of the gross
income of each citizen is properly required for the support of
his family, according to its number & other circumstances, and
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let so much of the rest as may be required, all if necessary, be
taken for the support of the War, as a small price for the
Liberty we are to win, and a no less small counterbalance for
the contribution which those make who give thier [sic] blood
in the cause!
So much for the future.
Now, how shall we deal with the debt of the past, which a
postponement of this duty of taxation has created? Is there not
some plan by which the actual debt of the Government can be
reduced to its proper description in coin, without injustice or
injury to the holders of the debt? It seems to me it should
be possible to reduce it to a specie standard, with entire justice
to its holders, and without leaving upon our new Government
an undue burden, or one from which it cannot soon relieve
itself.
Why may not a reasonable plan be founded upon the undisputed principle in economical science that no matter to
what extent the circulating medium of a country may, at any
time, have been augmented or diminished, its value always
remains unaltered?
Suppose the Government to have determined, as the Secretary’s plan implies, that a circulating medium of two hundred
million in amount, is the proper sum of currency for conducting the exchanges of commodities in the country, and suppose
it shall then call in the outstanding Treasury notes and put
into the hands of thier [sic] holders, in due individual proportion, two hundred millions of Government notes payable
after the war, in coin at the existing standard value, with a
strict pledge upon the face of the new issue that no more
shall be put out, wherein would the holders of the circulation
be injured? The two hundred million of new issue would represent precisely the same exchangeable value as did the eight
or ten hundred million for which it was substituted - and would
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buy the same amount of other property in market. Guarded
against increased & excessive issue it would be of fixed and
certain value, would be the effective sign of the same amount
of coin, and would be nearly as satisfactory as coin, serving
most of its functions, so long as we remain without foriegn
[sic] commerce; and as soon as Peace may reinstate our commerce with foriegn nations, the Government would be in condition to redeem with specie. This new currency would be
liable to only one risk or disadvantage in comparison with
gold, and that would be the contingency of Independence. If
we fail in the strugle [sic], the debt would be obliterated; but
as it is only a home debt, this consequence would be immaterial, if we lost our Liberty. / The chief inconvenience and
damage would be to those who have become debtors since the
war. They would have to pay a larger relative value for the
consideration they recieved [sic] than if the volume of circulation had not been reduced, unless equitable relief is provided.
For this class the States might provide a rateable reduction,
according to the date when the debt was incured [sic], for
payments in coin. But generally those who have contracted
debt since the war, have done so mostly in pursuit of speculative
purposes. The farmer and others engaged in regular & productive employments have not had occasion to go in debt; for
the exigencies of the war has created a market at remunerative
prices for all the fruits of thier [sic] labors. While, under the
plan suggested, the holders of the Treasury notes would, in
the two hundred million of new issue, hold a volume of currency of equal utility with that which they surrender for
extinguishment, and therefore would have suffered no appreciable loss, the Government, left with an indebtedness comparatively so small to be provided for after the war, would be
restored to a vigor of credit and hope that would be felt, in
all its future administration, upon the destinies of the Confederacy. Who would not sacrifice to such an end!
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But what can be done with that portion of the Treasury debt
which consists of interest bearing bonds. Those bonds were
issued for treasury notes, not for coin, & representing in truth
funded treasury notes, ought not to have advantages over the
current notes. Can anything be more reasonable than that the
nominal amount of this debt should be at once reduced, by
the same rule applied to the current notes, to actual coin value?
The whole point of my advice is that we who are carrying on
the war shall provide for its current cost: that we should return
at once to the standard of values which a properly limited currency establishes, and from which we should never have departed: and that in the moment of doing so we should conform
the outstanding debt resting upon past transactions, so far as
they have varied from it, to the same standard.
I confine this letter to the matter of the public finances, because money is the sinew of war; and if the Government cannot
sustain its revenues and currency, the revolution that brought
it into existence must fail, and Independence and Liberty fall.
Very truly yours
D. L. Yulee
Hon James M Baker
Senator from Florida
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